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Cheung: Maya v. Centex

CASE SUMMARY

MAYA v. CENTEX: POTENTIAL
LIABILITIES FOR DEVELOPERS
RELATED TO SPECULATIVE INJURIES

ALEXANDER CHEUNG*

INTRODUCTION
Prior to the sub-prime mortgage crisis from 2007 to 2010, 1 many
lenders approved substantial mortgages to prospective homebuyers who
lacked adequate financing. 2 Various market factors encouraged lenders
and prospective homeowners to engage in the housing market, including
“[f]avorable tax laws, high-leverage loan creativity, baby boomers

* J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco,
California; B.A. 2009, Criminal Justice, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, California. I
would like to thank the Golden Gate University Law Review Editorial Board, particularly Kate
Baldridge, Alexandra Vesalga, and Professor Ed Baskauskas, without whose guidance this paper
would not have been published. I am especially grateful to have the support of the law librarian
faculty advisors, Professor Michael Daw and Professor Jennifer Pesetksy. I would also like to thank
Professor Stefano Moscato who provided exceptional advice in shaping this article. Finally, I
dedicate this article in memory of my beloved late aunt and mother figure, Lillian Lee, for her
boundless, unconditional love and support.
1
MICHAEL T. MADISON, JEFFRY R. DWYER & STEVEN W. BENDER, THE LAW OF REAL
ESTATE FINANCING § 3:5 (rev. ed. 2012), available at Westlaw REFINLAW § 3:5 (stating that the
real estate decline from 2007 to 2010 was similar to the balance-sheet recession in the early 1990s);
Justin Pritchard, Mortgage Crisis Overview: What Caused the Mortgage Crisis?, ABOUT.COM
Banking/Loans, banking.about.com/od/mortgages/a/mortgagecrisis.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2012)
(stating that the mortgage crisis that reached the U.S. economy in 2007 was due to multiple factors,
including greed, fraud, and excessive borrowing).
2
Broderick Perkins, Housing Market Was 2006’s Top Business Story, REALTY TIMES (Jan.
3, 2007), realtytimes.com/rtpages/20070103_topstory.htm (“At the housing market’s peak, buyers
rushed to open houses, blank checks in hand. Lenders gave big-money mortgages to people who
could barely afford their monthly payments.” (quoting AP’s Ellen Simon)).
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buying second[] [houses] and day traders who became housing market
speculators.” 3 In 2007, however, the commercial and residential real
estate market rapidly declined, while lenders reduced the availability of
credit. 4 With limited access to credit, buyers financially incapable of
supporting their mortgages defaulted, resulting in “foreclosures
reach[ing] historic proportions in some demographic segments.” 5
Sub-prime mortgage loans contributed significantly to the collapse
of the real estate market. 6 A traditional, prime loan ordinarily consists of
a thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage for eighty percent of the purchase price,
requiring a down payment of twenty percent. 7 Lenders, however,
frequently approved sub-prime loans requiring very little or no down
payment. 8 Often, these loans were offered with little regard as to
borrowers’ financial ability to repay the loans. 9
Homeowners with sub-prime mortgages are more likely to be
unable to make mortgage payments because they lacked adequate
financial means at the time of the loan, and likely still do not have the
means. 10 A homeowner who is unable to pay the mortgage, refinance the
loan, or sell the house might resort to desertion. 11 Voluntarily

3

Id.
MADISON ET AL., supra note 1, § 3.5 ( “[I]n 2007 the commercial and multi-family real
estate markets declined amid both a severe credit crunch and a steep recession in both the Unite[d]
States and in the global economy.”).
5
Perkins, supra note 2; MADISON ET AL., supra note 1, § 3.5 (“The Federal Reserve Board’s
flow of funds report issued on March 20, 2008 indicate[d] that home equity declined to a record low
of 47.9% in the fourth quarter of 2007, the first time that homeowner debt on their homes exceeded
their equity since the Board started to track home equity data in 1945.”).
6
Stephanie Armour, Foreclosures Skyrocket 65% in April, USA TODAY (May 14, 2008),
www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2008-05-14-foreclosures-mortgage-apps_N.htm
(“Those hardest hit by the tsunami of foreclosures included Arizona, California, Florida and
Nevada—states where runaway subprime lending and escalating home prices symbolized the real
estate boom that fizzled in 2006.”).
7
Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1096 (2009).
8
Les Christie, Homeowners: Can’t Pay? Just Walk Away, CNNMONEY.COM (Feb. 7, 2008),
money.cnn.com/2008/02/06/real_estate/walking_away/index.htm (stating that most buyers’ down
payments were little to nothing, giving little incentive to continue bad investments).
9
Ann M. Burkhart, Real Estate Practice in the Twenty-first Century, 72 MO. L. REV. 1031,
1045-46 (2007) (lenders made close to forty-five percent of the subprime loans with little or no
documentation of the borrower’s income).
10
WILLIAM C. APGAR, THE MUNICIPAL COST OF FORECLOSURES: A CHICAGO CASE STUDY
2 (2005), available at www.nw.org/network/neighborworksProgs/foreclosuresolutions/pdf_docs
/2005Apgar-Dudastudy-FullVersion.pdf (stating that the poor credit of borrowers of nonprime loans
was an obvious factor, among others, as to why the foreclosure rate of nonprime loans can exceed
the foreclosure rate of prime loans by ten times).
11
Alan Mallach, Abandoned Property: Effective Strategies To Reclaim Community Assets,
Housing
Facts
&
Findings,
May
10,
2004,
at
5-6,
available
at
www.knowledgeplex.org/cache/documents/30370.pdf (stating that homeowners and heirs abandon
4
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abandoning a home financed by a sub-prime loan may be an
economically rational decision for a borrower who contributed little to no
down payment, because he or she has little incentive to repay the loan. 12
Homeowners who walked away from bad deals may have cut their
personal losses, but damages from foreclosed and abandoned properties
do not stop with the deserter. 13
Foreclosed and vacant properties can cause dire consequences in
their communities. 14 Foreclosed and deserted homes often become a
breeding ground for various criminal activities. 15 These non-pecuniary,
quality-of-life issues are often of great concern to families and
prospective homebuyers, and can lead to decreased desirability of the
properties surrounding foreclosed and abandoned homes, ultimately
decreasing the surrounding properties’ value. 16
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Maya v. Centex addresses the
impacts of the sub-prime mortgage crisis on fiscally responsible
homeowners. 17 Maya is the first appellate decision to potentially permit
homeowners to assert claims against developers for injuries related to
market-wide decline in property values. 18 In Maya, the Ninth Circuit
decided only the narrow question of whether plaintiff-homeowners have
constitutional standing to pursue claims against defendant-developers for
injuries that were allegedly caused by the defendants’ high-risk

their properties when they believe that the properties cannot be sold in the marketplace due to its
locality or a certain condition of it).
12
Christie, supra note 8 (stating that a homeowner who abandons a home that was financed
by a subprime loan may be better off economically than trying to continue making mortgage
payments. For example, “[s]omeone with good credit and a $600,000 home in a town with cratering
real estate prices could buy a similar house nearby for $450,000, and then let the other $600,000
mortgage go into foreclosure” because “[c]redit scores are hurt much more by missing multiple
payments . . . than by a single foreclosure.”).
13
Mallach, supra note 11, at 5-6 (“The presence of abandoned property decreases a
community’s property values, discourages investment by existing residents and potential developers,
and may encourage further abandonment.”).
14
Id. (“A Philadelphia study found that the presence of one abandoned property on a block
reduced the value of the other properties on the block by nearly $6,500 each.”).
15
Id. at 6 (stating that vacant properties often become a venue for various criminal activities,
“including prostitution and drug trafficking”); APGAR, supra note 10, at 10 (stating that police
officers observe at abandoned properties a wide range of criminal conduct, “including gang activity,
drug dealing, prostitution, arson, rape, and even murder”).
16
Mallach, supra note 11, at 3, 5-6; see also id. at 7 (quoting Mayor John F. Street).
17
Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1065 (9th Cir. 2011).
18
Subdivision Homeowners Have Standing To Sue Developer Claiming Its Marketing of
Homes to Unqualified Applicants Led to Inordinate Foreclosures and Drop in Property Values,
CAL. TORT. REP., Oct. 2011, available at Westlaw 32 No. 9 CAL. TORT REP. 3; Dan Schechter,
Developers and Lenders May Be Liable for Artificially Creating Demand Within New Housing
Tract, Thus Causing Buyers To Overpay, COMM. FIN. NEWS, Sept. 26, 2011, available at Westlaw
2011 COMM. FIN. NEWS 78.
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marketing and financing behaviors. 19 Although the Ninth Circuit did not
resolve the plaintiffs’ claims, it held that the plaintiffs have constitutional
standing to assert their claims against the defendants. 20 In doing so, the
Ninth Circuit may have extended liability to developers for speculative
injuries that may not be fairly traceable to the developers’ challenged
conduct.
MAYA V. CENTEX: GREED AND FRAUD, THE “BUYING FRENZY”
LAWSUIT

I.

A. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In Maya v. Centex, plaintiffs Sylvester Maya and Ofer Masachi
brought a putative class action on behalf of themselves and other
Both plaintiffs had purchased
similarly situated homeowners. 21
residential realty from Centex Homes in November 2005 in San
Bernardino County, California. 22 Defendants Centex Corporation,
Centex Homes, and CTX Mortgage Company, 23 together, were one of
the biggest housing developers in the nation. 24
Plaintiffs alleged that defendants created a “buying frenzy” that
raised housing demand and prices through the misrepresentation and
omission of material facts related to the defendants’ challenged
conduct. 25 Plaintiffs argued that defendants’ alleged high-risk marketing
and financing behavior were material to their home-buying decisions
because the risk of numerous foreclosures in the plaintiffs’ communities
could severely decrease the value and desirability of the community and
the properties within. 26
In order to attract prospective homeowners to purchase homes,
defendants allegedly devised a marketing scheme to raise housing profits
and demand through misrepresenting the new developments as a
community of stable families. 27 In furtherance of their marketing
scheme, defendants assisted and facilitated home purchases within

19

Maya, 658 F.3d at 1065.
Id. at 1073.
21
Maya v. Centex Corp., No. EDCV 09-01671 VAP (OPx), 2010 WL 6843322, at *1 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 31, 2010), rev’d, 658 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2011).
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Maya, 658 F.3d at 1065.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 1065-66.
27
Maya, 2010 WL 6843322, at *1.
20
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plaintiffs’ particular neighborhood to unqualified buyers who were
highly susceptible to the risk of foreclosure. 28 Defendants’ financing
subsidiaries financed the unqualified buyers’ mortgages. 29 Further,
defendants sold homes to speculators and investors who had no intention
of actually residing within the community. 30 Plaintiffs claimed that
defendants “concealed and intentionally failed to disclose” these facts to
the plaintiff-homebuyers. 31
Plaintiffs alleged five claims, including fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. 32 Additionally, plaintiffs claimed violation of California’s
Unfair Business Practices Act and false advertising law. 33 Plaintiffs
sought compensatory damages and the right to rescind their home
purchases, in addition to attorney’s fees and costs. 34
The defendants made similar arguments in their respective motions
to dismiss. 35
First, they argued that the plaintiffs had neither
constitutional nor statutory standing to invoke federal jurisdiction. 36
Second, they argued that the plaintiffs’ allegations failed to meet the
pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) because
plaintiffs failed to plead with particularity the circumstances to support
their fraud-based claims. 37 Third, the defendants argued that the
plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which the court may grant relief
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 38
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims for lack of constitutional
standing, finding that the plaintiffs failed to meet two requirements for
standing: injury-in-fact and causation. 39 Specifically, the district court

28

Id. at *1-2.
Maya, 658 F.3d at 1065 (Plaintiffs “allege[d] that defendants financed at least [sixty-five
percent] of the mortgages on homes in their communities”).
30
Maya, 2010 WL 6843322, at *1-2.
31
Id. at *2.
32
Id.
33
Id.; see CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, 17500 (Westlaw 2013).
34
Maya, 658 F.3d at 1065; see also First Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 61-78, Maya, 2010 WL
6843322 (No. 509CV01671), 2009 WL 5439289.
35
Maya, 2010 WL 6843322, at *2; Maya, 658 F.3d at 1066.
36
Maya, 2010 WL 6843322, at *2; Maya, 658 F.3d at 1066.
37
Maya, 2010 WL 6843322, at *2; Maya, 658 F.3d at 1066; see FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b)
(requiring that the pleading party allege with particularity the circumstances warranting a claim for
fraud).
38
Maya, 2010 WL 6843322, at *2; Maya, 658 F.3d at 1066; see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
39
Maya, 658 F.3d at 1066 (noting that the district court relied on three cases with similar
facts and held that plaintiffs failed to allege a sufficient injury in fact for constitutional standing
(citing Kaing v. Pulte Homes, Inc., No. 09-5057 SC, 2010 WL 625365 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2010);
29
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found that the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries were not actual injuries-in-fact40
and that causation between the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries and the
defendants’ challenged conduct of high-risk marketing and financing
behavior was not established. 41 Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s
decision to the Ninth Circuit after their request for leave to amend was
denied. 42
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court and clarified the
proper standard of review for constitutional standing, distinguishing it
from the analysis required for statutory standing. 43 The Ninth Circuit
held that plaintiffs had constitutional standing to pursue their claims
against defendants, but in holding so, the court addressed only the first
two elements of constitutional standing, because all parties
acknowledged that a favorable ruling would redress the plaintiffs’
alleged injuries. 44
The Ninth Circuit categorized plaintiffs’ claimed damages into two
broad categories: at-time-of-sale injuries and after-sale injuries. 45
Plaintiffs’ overpayment and rescission claims were considered injuries
that occurred at the time of the sale. 46 The Ninth Circuit recognized
plaintiffs’ overpayment and rescission claims as actual and concrete
economic injuries that occurred at the time of purchase. 47 The Ninth
Circuit further found that plaintiffs had established causation for their
overpayment and rescission claims, because defendants were able to
influence the terms of many buyers’ loans in plaintiffs’ particular
communities to “create demands that would not otherwise have
existed.” 48
Plaintiffs’ claims for decreased property value and desirability were
considered injuries that occurred after the sale. 49 The Ninth Circuit

Tingley v. Beazer Homes Corp., No. 3:07cv176, 2008 WL 1902108 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2008);
Green v. Beazer Homes Corp., No. 3:07-1098-CMC, 2007 WL 2688612, (D.S.C. Sept. 10, 2007))).
40
Maya, 2010 WL 6843322, at *5.
41
Id. at *11; Maya, 658 F.3d at 1066.
42
Maya, 658 F.3d 1060.
43
See id. at 1067.
44
Id. at 1069.
45
Id. at 1066.
46
Id. (noting that plaintiffs allegedly would not have purchased overvalued properties had
defendants disclosed facts that were material to evaluating the properties’ true value).
47
Id. at 1069 (stating that the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have recognized clear and
obvious economic injuries as a sufficient basis for standing).
48
Id. at 1070.
49
Id. at 1066.
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recognized plaintiffs’ decreased value and desirability claims as
cognizable injuries for constitutional standing purposes. 50 The Ninth
Circuit, however, held that plaintiffs did not establish sufficient causation
for constitutional standing because any loss related to such claims could
be ascribed to other, third-party actors not involved in the lawsuit. 51 But
the court did permit plaintiffs to amend their complaints and to provide
expert testimony to show causation between defendants’ alleged
misconduct and plaintiffs’ decreased property value and desirability
claims. 52 Further, the court noted that expert testimony could be used to
distinguish the causal link from other possible independent third parties
who may have contributed to plaintiffs’ alleged losses. 53
THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S STANDING ANALYSIS

II.

A. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING
Constitutional standing—the constitutional limitation on the federal
judiciary to hear only those cases or controversies over which it has
federal subject matter jurisdiction 54 —is the deciding factor in “whether
[a plaintiff] is entitled to have the [federal] court [to] decide the merits
of” a plaintiff’s claims. 55 A plaintiff who seeks the jurisdiction of the
federal court system must satisfy three requirements to establish that he
or she has constitutional standing: injury-in-fact, causation, and
redressability. 56
A plaintiff must prove that he or she suffered an “injury in fact” that
involves the intrusion of a legally protected right. 57 Two components

50

Id. at 1070-71.
Id. at 1072 (“We agree with the district court that plaintiffs have not established how
defendants’ actions necessarily result in foreclosure, nor do plaintiffs’ complaints allege that the
decreased value is caused by the risk posed by their neighbors (even absent foreclosures).” (footnote
omitted)); Maya v. Centex Corp., No. EDCV 09-01671 VAP (OPx), 2010 WL 6843322, at *9 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 31, 2010), rev’d, 658 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2011).
52
Maya, 658 F.3d at 1072-73 (citing Barnum Timber Co. v. EPA, 633 F.3d 894, 900-01 (9th
Cir. 2011)).
53
Id.
54
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Jasmine Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court, 180 Cal. App.
4th 980, 990 (6th Dist. 2009).
55
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498
(1975)).
56
Maya, 658 F.3d at 1067 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc., v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC),
Inc, 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61
(1992))).
57
Id. (citing Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180-81).
51
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determine whether a plaintiff has suffered an injury-in-fact. 58 First, a
plaintiff’s injury must be “concrete and particularized.” 59 Second,
plaintiff must have suffered actual losses, damages, or injury, or be able
to show that such a loss is likely to occur, 60 and the injury must not be
speculative. 61 Economic injuries can satisfy this requirement. 62 The
purpose of these two components is to gauge whether the injury is too
abstract to be judicially cognizable. 63
The injury-in-fact requirement may also encompass alleged injuries
that are dependent on future events. 64 Although standing is not
established when the alleged injury depends on the occurrence of
“contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed
may not occur at all,” 65 a contingent liability—one whose occurrence is
dependent on the outcome of a future event—may constitute an injuryin-fact if it encompasses actual and imminent consequences. 66
Second, the party who invokes federal jurisdiction must establish a
causal connection between the alleged injury-in-fact and the defendant’s
challenged conduct. 67 That is, plaintiff’s claimed injury must be “fairly
traceable” to the defendant’s particular acts or omissions. 68 A causal
chain that involves numerous links does not necessarily render the causal
relationship too tenuous if those links are not speculative. 69

58

Id. (citing Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180-81 (plaintiff must have suffered an
“‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical”)).
59
Id.
60
Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (plaintiff must show that
he or she has suffered an actual loss, damage or injury, or is threatened with impairment of his or her
own interests).
61
Maya, 658 F.3d at 1069.
62
Id. (noting that the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have recognized clear and
obvious economic injuries as a sufficient basis for standing).
63
7 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 76 (10th ed. 2005).
64
See, e.g., Clinton v. City of N.Y., 524 U.S. 417, 431 (1998) (“[A] substantial contingent
liability immediately and directly affects the borrowing power, financial strength, and fiscal planning
of the potential obligor.”).
65
See Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81, (1985) (dealing with
ripeness doctrine, but standard is presumably the same)).
66
Clinton, 524 U.S. at 431.
67
Maya, 658 F.3d at 1070 (“To survive a motion to dismiss for lack of constitutional
standing, plaintiffs must establish a ‘line of causation’ between defendants’ action and their alleged
harm that is more than ‘attenuated.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757
(1984))).
68
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992); Allen, 468 U.S. at 757.
69
Maya, 658 F.3d at 1070 (“A causal chain does not fail simply because it has several
‘links,’ provided those links are ‘not hypothetical or tenuous’ and remain ‘[plausible].’”).
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Finally, constitutional standing requires that the plaintiff establish a
substantial likelihood that the relief sought will redress the alleged
injury. 70 It is not enough that a favorable judgment will punish the
defendant or simply give plaintiff satisfaction; a decision in favor of the
plaintiff must likely, rather than conjecturally, redress the plaintiff’s
injury-in-fact. 71
B. STATUTORY STANDING
For statutory standing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), the analysis is mainly restricted to the content of a plaintiff’s
complaint under the standards of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal. 72 Under Twombly, a plaintiff must plead factual
allegations that are strong enough to support a plaintiff’s right to relief,
and the pleadings must be “plausible on [their] face”—a standard that is
higher than mere speculation. 73 Under Iqbal, plausibility requires the
factual content of a plaintiff’s pleadings to be such that the court may
reasonably infer that the defendant is likely liable for the particular
challenged act or omission. 74
Taken together, Twombly and Iqbal address the merits of a claim, or
its legality, to measure whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which
the court can grant relief. 75 With Twombly and Iqbal, the Court
developed two-prong approach to address how a plaintiff’s pleading may
survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 76 First, the
reviewing court need not credit mere legal conclusions. 77 Second, the

70

Id. at 1067.
See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998) (psychic
satisfaction is not enough for Art III standing).
72
Maya, 658 F.3d at 1067-68.
73
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (stating that a plaintiff must only
plead enough facts to support a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face,” effectively requiring
that claim be more than merely conceivable).
74
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”).
75
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“In keeping with these principles [of Twombly] a court considering
a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the
framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are wellpleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”).
76
Maya, 658 F.3d at 1067-68.
77
Id. at 1067.
71
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reviewing court must examine the factual allegations to determine if they
state a plausible claim for relief. 78
C. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S CLARIFICATION OF THE STANDARD OF
REVIEW FOR CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING
The Ninth Circuit held that the district court inappropriately
dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims for lack of constitutional standing under
Rule 12(b)(6)—failure to state a claim upon which the court may grant
relief. 79 If a plaintiff does not meet the requirements for constitutional
standing, the court “lack[s] [the] power to entertain the proceeding“ and
must dismiss the action under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter
The absence of statutory standing, rather than
jurisdiction. 80
constitutional standing, requires a court to dismiss a plaintiff’s claim
under Rule 12(b)(6). 81 Thus, the Ninth Circuit found that the district
court engaged in an improper scope of review of the plaintiffs’ claims. 82
The Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing the
plaintiffs’ claims for lack of constitutional standing under Rule 12(b)(6)
because Twombly and Iqbal—the cases defining statutory standing
requirements—are not applicable within the context of constitutional
standing. 83 The elements of constitutional standing—injury-in-fact,
causation, and redressability—turn on the “nature and source” of a
plaintiff’s asserted claim. 84 That is, the substance of constitutional
standing is to measure whether a plaintiff’s pleadings show a sufficient
personal stake in the outcome of his or her claim so as to call upon the
federal courts’ jurisdiction for redressability. 85
The context of constitutional standing is a question of subject matter
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), which is distinct from the analysis of
the merits of a plaintiff’s claims under Twombly and Iqbal. 86
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that analysis of a plaintiff’s merits is

78

Id. at 1067-68.
Id. at 1073; see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
80
Jasmine Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court, 180 Cal. App. 4th 980, 990 (6th Dist. 2009)
(citation omitted); Maya, 658 F.3d at 1067; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see FED. R. CIV. P.
12(b)(1).
81
Maya, 658 F.3d at 1067.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 1067-68 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007)).
84
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
85
Id. at 498-99 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
86
Maya, 658 F.3d at 1068; see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).
79
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not necessary, nor is it proper for purposes of constitutional standing, 87
because Twombly and Iqbal deal with a “fundamentally different
issue.” 88 Thus, the district court improperly assessed the merits of the
plaintiffs’ claims, deviating from the proper review for lack of
constitutional standing.
D. OVERPAYMENT AND RESCISSION
The district court held that plaintiffs’ overpayment and rescission
claims were “too speculative to constitute an injury-in-fact” because
plaintiffs allegedly may have earned a profit if they had sold their homes
later when their property values rise. 89 Further, the district court held
that plaintiffs did not establish sufficient causation between defendants’
actions and plaintiffs’ payment of artificially inflated prices. 90 The
district court reasoned that the rise in housing prices was a “nationwide
phenomenon” that was attributable to other independent variables and,
thus, was independent of defendants’ challenged actions. 91
The Ninth Circuit, however, recognized plaintiffs’ overpayment and
rescission claims as actual and concrete economic injuries for
constitutional standing purposes. 92 Due to defendants’ concealment of
critical information about the housing development and the defendants’
marketing scheme, plaintiffs claimed that they were economically
injured when they “paid more for their homes than the homes were worth
at the time of the sale.” 93 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that selling their
homes for a potential profit in the future would not redress plaintiffs’
economic injury because plaintiffs overpaid for the property at the time
of sale. 94 Moreover, plaintiffs argued that they would not have
purchased their homes had defendants disclosed their high-risk
marketing and financing behavior. 95 Thus, the Ninth Circuit agreed that
plaintiffs’ economic injury was a sufficient injury-in-fact for
constitutional standing purposes. 96
87

Id. (citing Equity Lifestyle Props., Inc. v. San Luis Obispo, 548 F.3d 1184, 1189 & n.10
(9th Cir. 2008)).
88
Id.
89
Maya v. Centex Corp., No. EDCV 09-01671 VAP (OPx), 2010 WL 6843322, at *8 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 31, 2010), rev’d, 658 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2011); Maya, 658 F.3d at 1069.
90
Maya, 658 F.3d at 1070.
91
Id. (citing Maya, 2010 WL 6843322, at *11).
92
Id. at 1069 (stating that the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have recognized clear and
obvious economic injuries as a sufficient basis for standing).
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id. (“This is a quintessential injury-in-fact.”).
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Plaintiffs argued that defendants’ nondisclosure and intentional
concealment of defendants’ challenged conduct caused plaintiffs to
Plaintiffs alleged that
suffer their alleged economic injuries. 97
defendants misrepresented their intention to offer “homes only to people
who will occupy them,” and rather “sold homes to investors who had no
intent to reside in the homes and who were more likely to” abandon their
properties when economic adversity arose. 98 Defendants advertised
properties to “unqualified buyers” 99 who were financially unable to
qualify for traditional prime loans, 100 making them likely recipients of
Additionally, plaintiffs argued that these
sub-prime loans. 101
“unqualified buyers” were more likely to face foreclosure. 102 Moreover,
defendants allegedly “financed at least [sixty-five percent] of the
mortgages on homes in [plaintiffs’ particular] communities.” 103
The Ninth Circuit interpreted the facts favorably to the plaintiffs,
and found that plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that defendants caused
their economic injury of overpayment for constitutional standing
purposes, giving plaintiffs the right to pursue these claims against
defendants. 104 The court reasoned that defendants were able to
manipulate many of the loans’ terms to artificially generate demand that
would not have occurred but for defendants’ extended financing to the
majority of buyers, including unqualified buyers, in the plaintiffs’
particular neighborhoods. 105 Additionally, since plaintiffs’ communities
were new developments, the Ninth Circuit had no other independent
economic data to compare the neighborhoods’ value against. 106 Under
the circumstances, the Maya court held that plaintiffs can plausibly claim
that the defendants’ marketing and financial practices created the
“artificial demand” that can be attributed to plaintiffs’ heightened
purchase price for their homes. 107

97

Id. at 1065.
Id.
99
Id. & n.2 (“Plaintiffs do not explicitly define what they mean by ‘unqualified’ buyers, but
it appears their definition encompasses those with unverified income, poor credit history, or inability
to make a down payment of less [sic] than 20% of the home’s value.”).
100
Bar-Gill, supra note 7, at 1096 & n.72 (2009) (stating that the traditional, prime loan is a
relatively simple thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage “for 80 percent, or less, of the home price,”
requiring an initial down payment of at least 20%).
101
Id. at 1097 & n.75 (“In 2005 and 2006, the median subprime home buyer put no money
down, borrowing 100 percent of the purchase price of the house.”).
102
Maya, 658 F.3d at 1065.
103
Id. at 1065.
104
Id. at 1070.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
98
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The Ninth Circuit found causation between defendants’ actions and
plaintiffs’ rescission claim to be strengthened by defendants’ alleged
nondisclosure of material information that was closely related to
plaintiffs’ economic injury. 108 Plaintiffs claimed that they would not
have purchased their homes if defendants had properly disclosed their
alleged high-risk marketing and financing behavior. 109 Thus, the Ninth
Circuit held that plaintiffs had alleged both injury and causation
sufficiently for overpayment and rescission claims for purposes of
constitutional standing. 110 On remand, the district court will determine
whether defendants are actually liable for plaintiffs’ overpayment and
rescission claims. 111
E. DECREASED VALUE AND DESIRABILITY
In Maya, the Ninth Circuit held that the reduced economic value of
plaintiffs’ homes is a cognizable injury for constitutional standing. 112
The Ninth Circuit cited a number of cases to support its holding on this
issue. 113 For instance, in Barnum Timber Co. v. United States
Environmental Protection Agency, the Ninth Circuit held that a
landowner’s allegation that his property would lose economic value due
to the “EPA’s impending classification of a neighboring creek as an
impaired water body had established an injury in fact sufficient to
withstand a motion to dismiss.” 114 Even considering the decline of the
national housing market, the court noted that plaintiffs’ main argument
was that “defendants’ acts caused their homes to lose value above and
beyond those losses caused by general economic conditions.” 115
Further, the Ninth Circuit held that a claim for decreased
desirability is an injury-in-fact sufficient for constitutional standing
purposes because “the blight resulting from defendants’ lending practices
[made] their homes less desirable places to live.” 116 The Ninth Circuit
also cited a number of cases for support of its holding on this issue. 117
For instance, in City of Sausalito v. O’Neil, the Ninth Circuit held that “a

108

Id.
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 1070-71 (“A current reduction in the economic value of one’s home is a cognizable
injury for constitutional standing purposes.”).
113
Id.
114
Id. (citing Barnum Timber v. EPA, 633 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2011)).
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 1071-72.
109
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city had constitutional standing to pursue its claim” of decreased
desirability because “defendants’ act would result in increased traffic,
crowds, decreased attractiveness, and damage to the town’s historical
character.” 118
The Ninth Circuit, however, agreed with the district court’s ruling
that plaintiffs did not establish sufficient causation to link defendants’
alleged actions to plaintiffs’ decreased property value and desirability
claims. 119 The district court held that plaintiffs lacked sufficient
causation for these claims because any alleged loss of property value or
desirability can be traced not only to defendants’ actions, “but also [to]
the independent actions of others” not involved in the lawsuit. 120 The
district court noted specific examples, including “homeowners [and
unqualified buyers] in Plaintiffs’ neighborhoods who defaulted on their
mortgages and third-party mortgage companies that foreclosed on houses
in Plaintiffs’ neighborhoods.” 121 In short, plaintiffs did not show how
defendants’ actions caused the inordinate number of foreclosures in
plaintiffs’ particular communities because it was other, independent third
parties who initiated those foreclosure proceedings—not defendants
themselves. 122 Thus, the district court found plaintiffs’ claims to be
“necessarily [dependent] upon a causal chain that includes numerous
independent forces and individual decisions of” other independent, third
parties not involved in the lawsuit. 123
Despite the lack of causation, the Ninth Circuit permitted the
plaintiffs to amend their complaints. 124 The Ninth Circuit noted that it
was possible that plaintiffs’ complaints could be saved by amendment
because expert testimony could be used to establish the causal effect
between defendants’ actions and plaintiffs’ injuries. 125 Furthermore,
expert testimony may be used to distinguish the causal effect between
defendants’ actions and plaintiffs’ injuries from other independent
variables, such as third parties and the general economy. 126 Since
“[b]efore the district court, plaintiffs offered to amend and produce an
118

Id. (citing City of Sausalito v. O’Neil, 386 F.3d 1186, 1198-99 (9th Cir. 2004)).
Id. at 1072 (“We agree with the district court that plaintiffs have not established how
defendants’ actions necessarily result in foreclosure, nor do plaintiffs’ complaints allege that the
decreased value is caused by the risk posed by their neighbors (even absent foreclosures).”).
120
Maya v. Centex Corp., No. EDCV 09-01671 VAP (OPx), 2010 WL 6843322, at *9 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 31, 2010), rev’d, 658 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2011).
121
Id.
122
Maya, 658 F.3d at 1072; Maya, 2010 WL 6843322, at *9.
123
Maya, 2010 WL 6843322, at *9 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 56061 (1992)).
124
Maya, 658 F.3d at 1073.
125
Id. at 1072-73 (citing Barnum Timber Co. v. EPA, 633 F.3d 894, 900-01 (9th Cir. 2011)).
126
Id.
119
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expert report distinguishing the effects of defendants’ actions from
general economic influences,” the Ninth Circuit permitted plaintiffs to
amend their complaints on remand. 127
F. MAYA’S IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REAL ESTATE FIELD AND
HOUSING MARKET
Although Maya’s ruling may help numerous similarly situated
homeowners seeking redress against developers for speculative injuries
that may not be fairly traceable to the developers, Maya could be
extended to other contexts in which a plaintiff alleges an injury that may
not yet have occurred “through a formal economic transaction.” 128 With
a chance to pursue their claims against defendants and establish
causation for decreased value and desirability claims through expert
testimony, the plaintiffs’ class action suit may reach the trial stage, where
a sympathetic jury could find the developers liable. 129 Housing
developers throughout California and the rest of the country will be
“nervously” following the case’s progress on remand. 130
CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Maya could allow numerous
homeowners to assert claims against real estate developers for injuries
that resulted from third-party foreclosures. As the case illustrates, for
purposes of constitutional standing, the decreased value and desirability
of a homeowner’s property may constitute as an injury-in-fact to invoke
the federal jurisdiction for redressability, provided that the homeowner
can link his alleged injury causally to a defendant’s action. By clarifying
the proper standard of review for questions of subject matter jurisdiction
and constitutional standing, the Ninth Circuit may have extended liability

127

Id.
Maya v. Centex: Lawsuit Alleging High-Risk Loans Diminished Neighborhood Property
Values May Proceed, IMPACT LITIG. J. (Oct. 26, 2011), www.impactlitigation.com/2011/10/26/
maya-v-centex-lawsuit-alleging-high-risk-loans-diminished-neighborhood-property-values-mayproceed.
129
Roger Bernhardt, Maya v. Centex Corp., Golden Gate Sch. of Law Faculty Scholarship,
Paper
No.
475
(2011),
available
at
digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1473&context=pubs (“This opinion could act as a warning shot across the bow for many
major players in the real estate industry. The plaintiffs should not have too much trouble
corroborating their factual allegations or obtaining expert testimony to endorse their theories. If they
can get the matter to a sympathetic jury, who knows what could happen?”).
130
Steven G. Lee, Developers May Be Liable to Homeowners for Marketing to Sub-prime
Buyers, CAL. LITIG. ATTORNEY BLOG (Oct. 19, 2011), www.rhlaw.com/blog/developers-may-beliable-to-homeowners-for-marketing-to-sub-prime-buyers.
128
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for developers who promise prospective homeowners stable housing
developments for speculative injuries that may not be directly traceable
to the developers’ conduct. Maya’s implications may extend nationwide
because the plaintiffs’ putative class includes homeowners living in new
housing developments in dozens of states. 131

131

John Roemer, Homeowners Get a Boost in Class Action Against Builders, DAILY J., (Sept.
22, 2011) (defendants “include eight of the nation’s largest home developers and their mortgage
subsidiaries, including Lennar Corp., Centex Homes, D.R. Horton Inc., Richmond American Homes
of California Inc., Beazer Homes USA Inc., Shea Homes Inc., Ryland Homes of California Inc., and
Standard Pacific Corp.”).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol43/iss1/9

16

